In strategic circles, much attention has been focused on the rapid expansion of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). According to the Global Firepower 2025 report, the PLAN currently boasts 754 sea-faring vessels, compared to the United States Navy's 440. These vessels encompass a wide range of categories, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, minesweepers, research ships, offshore patrol gunboats, and submarines.
The significant growth in the PLAN's fleet over the past decade appears to be a deliberate effort to assert dominance over the South China Sea and its surrounding areas. Leveraging the global supply chain for steel and other raw materials, China has honed its shipbuilding capabilities and now holds the title of the world's largest shipbuilder for both military and civilian purposes, surpassing the United States.
Interestingly, the combined tonnage of the U.S. Navy is 4.1 million tons, significantly larger than the PLAN’s 2.8 million tons. This discrepancy suggests differing naval strategies. China’s smaller vessels may reflect a focus on regional conflicts, particularly a potential offensive across the Taiwan Strait. Smaller, more numerous ships may offer strategic advantages, such as reduced vulnerability to Taiwan’s formidable shore defences, which could quickly neutralize larger vessels.
The composition of each navy further highlights their distinct priorities. The U.S. Navy operates 81 destroyers, whereas the PLAN has 50. Conversely, China has 222 corvettes and patrol vessels compared to just 26 corvettes in the U.S. fleet. While the U.S. Navy is designed as a global force, the PLAN is better suited for regional operations and near-shore conflicts. This focus on littoral (shallow water) capabilities has enabled China to engage in frequent, low-level skirmishes in the South China Sea over the past decade.
Despite its impressive growth, the PLAN faces significant challenges in achieving the status of a global naval power. Operational experience is a major hurdle. Unlike the U.S. Navy or even India, China’s naval forces have little to no combat experience over the last 70 years. While the value of combat experience is debated, even the most advanced navies require practical expertise to develop effective tactics and strategies. Modern naval warfare evolves rapidly, rendering tactics from World War II, such as amphibious assaults, obsolete in scenarios like a conflict over Taiwan. Unlike the lightly defended beaches of Normandy, Taiwan's coastlines are heavily fortified with long-range missiles capable of striking PLAN vessels soon after they leave Chinese waters.
Another critical factor affecting naval effectiveness is maintenance. At any given time, 15–20% of a navy’s vessels are typically undergoing repairs or maintenance, with this number rising to over 30% during prolonged conflicts. For the PLAN, this means only 525–640 vessels may be operationally available. Similarly, the U.S. Navy can deploy around 300–350 ships and submarines depending on the situation.
However, the U.S. holds significant advantages. It maintains eight combat-ready aircraft carrier groups, with an additional three undergoing maintenance. In contrast, China has only four aircraft carriers, two of which are newly commissioned and not yet fully equipped with advanced combat aircraft. Furthermore, training naval and air force pilots in modern combat tactics remains a substantial challenge for the PLAN.
Geography and geopolitics also favour the U.S. The U.S. maintains significant military and naval assets near the South China Sea, stationed in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. These forces pose a substantial threat to Chinese coastlines during conflicts. Conversely, China possesses no comparable threat to U.S. shores. With no hostile militaries stationed in proximity, the U.S. enjoys unparalleled security along its coasts.
For the PLAN, defending China’s extensive coastline is a priority, which may tie up over 50% of its combat-ready vessels. This leaves only 250–300 ships available for forward deployment in blue waters, where logistical challenges further complicate operations. Unlike the U.S., China has few international bases to support extended missions, limiting its strategic reach.
Even in comparisons with the smaller Indian Navy, the PLAN faces strategic disadvantages. India operates a fleet of 293 vessels, of which approximately 205 can be deployed during conflicts. The geographic advantage lies with India, as it’s naval and air forces can quickly mobilize from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Malacca Strait, a critical choke point for Chinese ships. In contrast, the PLAN must operate 3,500 miles from its home bases, making its ships vulnerable to Indian bombardment.
Finally, in the event of a conflict, China risks facing a coalition of nations, including the U.S., India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Such an alliance would significantly limit the PLAN’s operational freedom in both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean; further underscoring the strategic challenges China must overcome to establish true naval dominance.
