With shifting geopolitical dynamics, the world's second-largest ocean is rapidly becoming a potential zone of conflict. While the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are gradually stabilizing, the Indian Ocean is increasingly viewed as an arena for great power rivalry. Reflecting this growing importance, the U.S. military's Pacific Command was recently renamed the Indo-Pacific Command. Though the geographic scope of the command remains unchanged, the addition of "Indo" highlights the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
The Indian Ocean was first referred to by its current name sometimes in 1515. Prior to that, it was sometimes called the Afro-Asian Ocean, reflecting the continents that bordered it. Different explorers named it according to their vantage points: Western seafarers referred to it as the Eastern Ocean, while Chinese travellers, approaching from the east, called it the Western Oceans. Ancient Greek mariners, who reached India by sea, named its north-western part (including todays Arabian Sea) the Erythraean Sea. In ancient Sanskrit texts, it was called Ratnakar, meaning "the ocean of jewels." The name "Indian Ocean" comes from the Latin Oceanus Orientalis Indicus, meaning "Eastern Indian Ocean."
Historically, although the Indian Ocean has been one of the busiest maritime routes, it did not hold significant geopolitical importance for much of history. This was mainly because most invasions of the Indian subcontinent came overland from the west, following routes like the one used by Alexander in 326 BC through the northwest. No major invasions of India occurred via the sea, nor did India launch naval attacks westward toward Africa. However, the Indian Ocean did facilitate extensive trade and cultural exchanges, particularly between western India, Madagascar, and East Africa. Similarly, the southern Indian states fostered deep cultural ties with the Indonesian islands on the eastern side of the Indian Ocean.�
The ocean did not emerge as a region of significant geopolitical interest until the early 17th century, when European colonial powers began to take shape. The Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French turned their attention to the economically rich areas of India and the Indonesian islands. With the powerful navies of these nations crisscrossing the Indian Ocean, a new era of colonialism began. Within a century, they had largely consolidated their holdings: the Dutch controlled the Indonesian region, while the English claimed India, the Jewel in the Crown. The French and Portuguese, gradually edged out, were left with only small parcels of land in India over the next 50 years. The French were however able to retain large tracts of territories in the Far East, which were collectively known as the French Indo- China.
Despite the Indian Ocean becoming a crucial lifeline for these colonial empires, their navies rarely engaged in large-scale naval battles akin to the famous Battle of Trafalgar between Admiral Nelson and Napoleons fleet. Instead, the European powers won and lost territories primarily through land-based conflicts, with few naval skirmishes on the high seas.�This may have been due to the vastness of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, which allowed fleets to reach their destinations without encountering enemy fleets. In contrast, modern 21st-century naval conflicts look vastly different. With radar systems capable of scanning thousands of kilometres and hypersonic missiles travelling at speeds exceeding six times the speed of sound, no ship, no matter how distant, can evade the reach of modern projectiles.
The discovery of vast oil reserves in the Middle East drastically altered the geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The British quickly moved to secure these energy resources to fuel their navy, which was crucial for maintaining control over their colonial holdings. During both World Wars, Britain needed to protect its merchant ships travelling through the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and the Suez Canal from rival powers. The Second World War, however, marked the emergence of the U.S. Navy as the worlds dominant maritime force.
As India gained independence in 1947 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, ending the Cold War, Britains threat perception shifted significantly, leading to a sharp reduction in its military presence. By that time, the United States had already established itself as the worlds sole superpower, militarily projecting its influence across the globe.
The British, now a close ally of the U.S., leased Diego Garciaa small island in the Indian Ocean, located 1,700 kilometres south of India and 3,600 kilometres east of Africa. The U.S. transformed the island into a key naval base, allowing it to maintain a strategic foothold in the region. For years, the U.S. dominated the Indian Ocean, supported by its strong military presence in Diego Garcia and the western Pacific.
However, the rise of two regional powersChina and Indiahas since shifted the balance. A militarily assertive China, especially in the South China Sea, has increasingly challenged the U.S. in multiple domains, including science and technology. This led the U.S. to seek new regional allies, finding a natural partner in India, which has its own border disputes with China. India, along with Japan and Australia, both wary of Chinas growing influence, joined forces with the U.S. to form the Quad. Though officially a non-military alliance, the Quad nations have conducted operations closely tied to their military cooperation, positioning themselves as a counterbalance to China's imperial ambitions.
The Indian Oceans strategic significance in the regional geopolitical landscape had a profound and intriguing consequence. Although the British relinquished control of India in 1947, Winston Churchill was strongly opposed to granting Indians their full right to independence. India was a cornerstone of British economic power, but Churchills concerns extended beyond that. Like many other leaders, he was keenly aware of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, a vital economic route connecting Europe and the Middle East to the growing markets of the Far East. Securing these trade routes was essential, and under British rule, the responsibility for safeguarding the Indian Oceans waters fell to Britain. This protection ensured safe passage for British and American merchant and cargo ships traversing the region. However, Churchill worried about the implications for this security after Britains departure from India.�Who would safeguard British and allied trade vessels once they no longer controlled the subcontinent?
Churchill was also deeply paranoid about the prospect of Soviet influence in India after British withdrawal. He believed that if the Soviets gained a foothold in India, the security of the Indian Ocean would be in jeopardy. This concern wasnt new; Britain had long been wary of Russian ambitions in the region. As early as the 1830s, during the Great Game, both Britain and Russia vied for control in Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. The British feared a Russian invasion of India via Afghanistan, while the Russians were concerned about British encroachments into Central Asia. This geopolitical rivalry persisted until the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which established clear zones of influence in Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet. To safeguard India, the British had even helped create Afghanistan as a buffer state in case of a Russian incursion.
In light of these historical tensions, Churchill adopted a similar strategy of creating a buffer zone, this time by quietly encouraging the partition of India along religious lines, resulting in the creation of Pakistan on Indias northern and western borders. While the partition into a Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan was already becoming inevitable, the British undoubtedly played a role in accelerating the process by supporting divisive forces within the country. Pakistan thus emerged as a new buffer state between India and Soviet Russia, alongside Afghanistan. The subsequent American arming of Pakistan was, of course, part of a broader strategy to bolster this buffer against Soviet influence. However, it also sparked a new geopolitical hotspot, fuelling the India-Pakistan rivalrya consequence with long-lasting implications.
Ultimately, the British demonstrated unwavering determination to prevent India from falling under Soviet influence, and at the same time collaborating with their American allies to maintain strategic control over the Indian Ocean.�
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become a critical trade corridor, facilitating about 40% of global trade and 80% of maritime oil shipments. Its strategic significance is heightened by three vital chokepoints: the Strait of Malacca to the east, and the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb to the west. Control over these narrow straits is crucial for global powers, as they serve as key entry and exit points into the Indian Ocean. Consequently, major navies, particularly those of the United States and India, are heavily invested in securing these choke points. It is to be noted that 30% of the global shipping passing through these choke points pertain to China.
In the early 21st century, piracy became a significant threat, with Somali pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean, alongside piracy incidents in the Strait of Malacca. The acts of piracy have so far been controlled well by the US and Indian navies. More recently, the ongoing Middle East crisis has given rise to an even deadlier threatHouthi rebels in Yemen. Using advanced anti-ship missiles, they have severely disrupted shipping routes originating from the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean, forcing many vessels to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.
Compounding these challenges is the growing presence of Chinas
Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), whose submarines and intelligence-gathering ships, often disguised as research vessels, are increasing tensions with established naval powers in the region. The ships are being monitored actively by both the Indian and US militaries. In fact China is facing a stiff resistance from the Indian Navy. India has also set up a huge naval base in North Agalega Island of Mauritius which is 1777 kilometres to the west of the American base of Diego Garcia. Both these bases are posing a formidable challenge to Chinese operations in the Indian Ocean.�
If China were to launch an invasion of Taiwan, it is likely that the United States and its allies would blockade the Strait of Malacca, sparking a potential conflict between PLAN and the U.S., British, and Indian navies in the IOR. Also if there is a flare up of the simmering border dispute between India and China in the Himalayas this can lead to a conflagration between the two powers in the Indian Ocean.
Once a relatively peaceful zone, the Indian Ocean now stands at risk of becoming a flashpoint for future geopolitical conflict.
